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SECURITIES LAW-CONSIDERATION OF TAX BENEFITS IN PRI
VATE DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER RULE

lOb-5-Salcer v. Envicon Eq

uities, 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984).

The role of tax benefits in securities law tax shelter fraud litiga
tion has received substantial attention in the courts. 1 In Salcer v. En
vicon Equities,2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that
1. Some have considered tax benefits relevant: SaIcer v. Envicon Equities, 744 F.2d
935, 943 (2d Cir. 1984) (Rule IOb-5 real estate tax shelter fraud action, court held tax
benefits must be considered); Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 440 (8th Cir. 1984)
(state law securities fraud action; court held tax benefits may be relevant to damage compu
tation); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982) rehearing en bane 768
F.2d 949 (1985)(suit brought under Rule IOb-5 for a fraudulent tax shelter; held that when
applying a rescissionary measure of damages, tax benefits should be considered); Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1025 (5th Cir.) (suit brought under Rule 1Ob-5 for misrepresenta
tion in sale of stock; held tax benefits should be considered in the calculation of damages),
cerro denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Gardner v. Surnamer, 608 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 n.3 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (action under Rule IOb-5 for misrepresentation, court stated tax benefits are rele
vant when considering damages); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(action for rescission under the federal securities laws where tax benefits are relevant and
plaintiffs have placed their incomes in issue, court ordered production of returns for consid
eration); Houlihan v. Anderson Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978) (Rule lOb
S suit where an adversary sought to use the amount of tax losses taken by a party; held such
evidence was relevant, and ordered production); Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061
63 (S.D. Texas 1978) (Rule IOb-5 action for rescission of a real estate investment; held
evidence of tax consequences relevant and admissible); Berg v. Xerxes-SouthdaIe Office
Bldg. Co., 290 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1980) (action under state securities law for fraud in
a commercial real estate investment, court stated income tax considerations may preclude
recovery).
Others have excluded evidence of tax benefits: Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826,
837-38 (9th Cir. 1984) (action under state and federal securities law for fraud in a cattle tax
shelter investment, court excluded evidence of tax benefits); Freschi v. Grand Coal Ven
ture, 588 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-60 (S.D.N.Y 1984) (action for damages under state law and
Rule IOb-5; held an investor's tax savings should not be deducted from his damage recov
ery); Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982) (action for
rescission under federal securities law; held that the defendants were not entitled to a credit
for tax benefits); Rhode v. Hershberger Explorations, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 993, 994 (D. Minn.
1972) (Rule 1Ob-5 action for a fraudulent oil well tax shelter promotion, court excluded
evidence of tax benefits received); Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (action for rescission or damages under federal securities laws; held the
defendants were not entitled to a reduction in damages for taxes saved); Cooper v. Hallgar
ten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (federal securities law action for rescis
sion; held that the plaintiffs' income tax returns were not relevant to the subject of
damages).
2. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984).
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any recovery in a Rule lOb-5 3 real estate tax shelter fraud case, where
rescission is impossible, must be reduced by the amount of tax benefits
accrued to the plaintiffs. This note, in Part I, will define the operative
law which must be considered in any Rule lOb-5 real estate tax shelter
litigation. Part II will consider the specific arguments raised in Salcer.
Finally, in Part III, the note will consider the result reached by the
court in Salcer and postulate a more expedient one. 4
I.

THE OPERATIVE LAW

Three areas of substantive law affect litigation involving real es
tate tax shelters: income tax law, partnership law, and securities law.
The Joint Commission on Internal Revenue Taxation has defined a
real estate tax shelters as an "investment in which a significant portion
of the investor's return is derived from the realization of tax savings on
other income as well as the receipt of tax-free cash flow from the in
3.

The plaintiffs brought suit under SEC Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means

or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
The action was also brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I
§ 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982)):
MANIPULATIVE AND DECEPTIVE DEVICES
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commmerce or of the mails, or of any facil
ity of any national securities exchange. . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange, or any security not so registered, any
manipUlative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
For a discussion of the history of Rule 10b-5, see Note, Rule lOb-5 Damages: The Runaway
Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 76, 76-79 (1975).
4. See infra notes 71-127 and accompanying text.
5. The tax shelter has come under increasing attack in recent years, with one com
mentator stating: "Tax shelters will be the Achilles heel of the federal income tax if the
Administration and the Congress do not move promptly to bring them under control."
Calkins and Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAW. 493, 519 (1973); see generally Com
ment, Auditing Partnership Tax Shelters: IRS Procedures and Taxpayer Liability, 60 NEB.
L. REV. 564-, 564-65 (1981).
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vestment itself."6 A tax shelter investor seeks to benefit from a ven
ture through cash flow, tax benefits, and appreciation in equity value,
which results in conversion of ordinary income into capital gain. 7
The real estate tax shelter normally arises in the partnership con
text. The partnership is of particular interest to highly compensated
individuals because losses may be passed through the partnership and
used to offset each partner's individual income. 8 Each partner may
take his or her share of the partnership losses to the extent of his or
her adjusted basis in the partnership interest. 9 In real estate shelters,
these artificial losses may be greatly increased by the partner's share of
nonrecourse financing. 10 Utilizing this method, a partner may be able
6. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., TAX SHELTERS: REAL ESTATE I (l975)[hereinafter cited as TAX SHELTERS]'
7. Id. at 2.
8. Section 701 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "A partnership as such shall
not be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as
partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities."
I.R.C. § 701 (1982). Profit or loss is first determined jointly at the partnership level. This
profit or loss is then distributed to the individual partners, and finally included in each
partner's individual taxable income. The type of profit or loss is defined further by
§ 702(b). It provides that the character of any item required to be separately stated by
paragraphs (I) through (7) of § 702(a) must be the same as if it were realized by the partner
directly from the source from which it was realized by the partnership. I.R.C. § 702(b)
(1982).
9. A partner's share of the partnership losses is determined by the partnership agree
ment. I.R.C. § 704(a) (1982). It provides: "A partner's distributive share of income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, be determined
by the partnership agreement." Id. Section 704(d) limits the amount of losses a partner
may take to his adjusted basis in the partnership interest; "[a1 partner's distributive share of
partnerhip loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted
basis of such partner's interest in the partnership . . ." I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982). A further
limitation is imposed by § 704(b) which requires the distributive share allocation to have
"substantial economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982); see A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P.
POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION chs. 82-83 (1985).
10. Section 465(a)(I) generally permits a partner to take losses "only to the extent of
the aggregate amount with respect to which the taxpayer is at risk." I.R.C. § 465(a)(I)
(1982). A taxpayer is considered "at risk" with respect to amounts including "(A) the
amount of money and the adjusted basis of other property contributed by the taxpayer to
the activity, and (B) amounts borrowed with respect to such activity (as determined under
paragraph (2»." 1.R.c. § 465(b)(I) (1982). A taxpayer is considered "at risk" for amounts
borrowed only to the extent he "(A) is personally liable for the repayment of such amounts,
or (B) has pledged property, other than property used in such activity, as security for such
borrowed amount ...." I.R.C. § 465(b)(2) (1982). Therefore, a nonrecourse loan (a loan
for which the borrower is not personally liable) generally cannot increase a taxpayer's ad
justed basis for the purpose of generating losses, because the amount of the loan is not "at
risk." However, real estate borrowings, by virtue of § 465(c)(3)(D), are not subject to the
"at risk" limitations. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982). Thus, a real estate limited partnership
investment can still generate extensive artificial losses without the risk of personal liability.
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to deduct losses well in excess of his or her personal investment. I I Be
cause limited partners are generally not personally liable for obliga
tions of the partnership,12 the majority of real estate tax shelters are
limited partnerships. 13 It is the combination of substantial income tax
benefits and personal gain coupled with limited personal liability that
makes the real estate limited partnership investment so attractive.
The third operative area of law to consider in tax shelter litigation
is securities law. For purposes of federal securities law, the Supreme
Court has defined a security as any "contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
lead to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third
party. . . . "14 Because a real estate limited partnership investor is led
to expect profits solely through the activities of the general partner,
and limited partners are generally prohibited from interfering with
11. The following example shows how such a scenario might operate:
A hypothetical real estate partnership might show a $50,000 loss in one year.
Assume that this loss was obtained by taking the difference between $60,000 of
deductible depreciation and $10,000 of gross rents in excess of operating expenses
and interest. If the mortgage amortization, a nondeductible expense, were $2,000,
then the partnership would have a positive cash flow of $8,000. If under the
partnership agreement one limited partner were entitled to 50% of partnership
losses and 37.5% of the cash flow, that partner would receive $3,000 in cash, but
his tax return would reflect only his share of the partnership's net loss, or
$25,000.
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173-74 & n.6 (1982), (citing Note, Real Estate Lim
ited Partnerships and Allocational Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue for Securities Fraud, 63
VA. L. REV. 669, 673 n.22 (1977» [hereinafter cited as The Incentive to Sue].
12. U.L.P.A. §§ 1 & 7; R.U.L.P.A. § 303. Practitioners should note that an organi
zation which may appear to be a partnership to the parties involved may not be a partner
ship to the IRS. The Service defines partnership as a "syndicate, group, pool, joint venture
or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust
or estate or a corporation." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1982); see also § 761(a) (1982).
On the other hand, a corporation is defined to include "associations, joint-stock com
panies, and insurance companies." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1982). For further clarification the
regulations provide six characteristics of a pure corporation: (1) associates; (2) an objective
to carry on business; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited
liability; and (6) transferability of interest. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1984). In deciding
whether an organization is a corporation or a partnership, the first two of these are elimi
nated because they are common to both, and the judgment is made on the basis of the four
subsequent characteristics. So long as an enterprise does not have more than two of these
four corporate characteristics, the regulations state the enterprise is a partnership for in
come tax purposes. Id. For further consideration see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d
729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Commissioner v. Larsen, 66 T.C. 159 (1976); and Rev. Rul. 79-106,
1979-1 C.B. 448.
13. E. BRODSKY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TAX SHELTER LITIGATION 14 (1978).
14. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); see Jacobs, The Meaning
of Security Under Rule JOb-5, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 211, 213-33 (1984).
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partnership operations,15 the limited partnership interest is a secur
ity,16 and therefore is subject to federal securities laws.17 Rule lOb-5
gives substantial protection to investors in securities. IS It broadly pro
15. Under § 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been enacted in
28 states and the District of Columbia, a limited partner's liability remains limited to his
investment unless he takes part "in the control of the business." UNIF. LIMITED PARTNER
SHIP ACT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969). Section 10(1) provides several very limited activities
that a limited partner may perform without participating "in the control of the business";
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the principal place of business ofthe part
nership, and at all times inspect and copy any of them.
(b) Have on demand true and full information of all things affecting the partner
ship affairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable, and
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of court.
UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 10(1), 6 U.L.A. 590 (1969). Section 303(a) of the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been enacted in 22 states, also re
stricts a limited partner from taking part "in the control of the business." REVISED UNIF.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 245-46 (Supp. 1985). Section 303(a) per
mits a limited partner to participate in several well-defined activities of the partnership
without participating in the control of the partnership, and thus without losing his limited
partner status. Id.
16. SEC regulations and judicial decisions support this conclusion. 17 C.F.R.
§ 24O.3all-l (1985)("The term 'equity security' is hereby defined to include any stock or
similar security, certificate of interest or . . . limited partnership interest. . . ."); SEC v.
Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 137 (7th Cir. 1982)("There is no dispute that the limited partner
ship interests constituted securities."); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir.
1980)("a limited partnership generally is a security, . . . because, by definition, it involves
investment in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.");
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1978)("the very legal requirements for
a limited partnership necessitate its including all of the attributes of a 'security' in the
interest bestowed upon one of limited partners.").
17. See, e.g., GUIDE 5 Preparation 0/ Registration Statements Relating to Interests in
Real Estate Limited Partnerships, SEC Release No. 33-6405, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~
3829 (1983) (a guide promulgated by the SEC to regulate requirements for registration
statements).
18. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had as a primary purpose full disclosure.
See S. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., lst Sess. 1 (quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431
(1953)). Rule lOb-5 is based on the expectation that all investors should have "relatively
equal access to material information." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848
(2d Cir. 1968). The rule has been called the most important securities provision in the
United States securities laws. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, § 1 at 1-4 (1980).
Courts have traditionally sought to interpret the rule broadly. Because this note considers
Rule lOb-5 only peripherally as a fraud provision through which an injured investor may
seek damages, its requirements for recovery and other applications will not be considered.
These issues have been discussed in great detail by others. See, e.g., 5 A. JACOBS, THE
IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 (1980) (contains a general discussion of the Rule lOb-5 action, its
possible applications, and recognized remedies); Ruder & Cross, Limitaitons on Civil Lia
bility Under Rule JOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125 (considers the limiting elements of a Rule
lOb-5 civil action); Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes 0/ the Beholder: Rule JOb-5's Application to
Acts o/Corporate Management, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674 (1972) (discusses Rule lOb-5's role
as a regulator of corporate management); Leader, Threshold Prerequisites to Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 48 TEX. L. REV. 417 (1970) (applies federal class action requirements
to Rule lOb-5 and other securities fraud provisions); Note, Retributive or Remedial: What is
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hibits using the mails or interstate commerce to engage in fraudulent
acts "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"19 and
thus it provides safeguards well in excess of those provided for by
common law fraud protections.
II.
A.

SALCER

The Facts

In Salcer, the plaintiffs were limited partners in Greenspoint As
sociates, a limited partnership established to construct and manage an
apartment complex. 20 The defendants were the general partners of
Greenspoint Associates, a 308-unit apartment complex located outside
the city of Houston. 21 Plaintiffs purchased their interests based on
sales literature developed by the defendants.22 The literature indicated
that the investment would be appropriate only for persons subject to
high rates of taxation. 23
Problems arose when the city of Houston annexed the land in
volved in September 1981.24 As a result, there was a forced sale of the
property, and each of the purchasers received a substantial loss on the
investment.25
At this point, the plaintiffs commenced an action in the district
court for the Southern District of New York under section 1O(b)(5) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 and SEC ~~l~ 1O~~.27 ~The_~ ___ _
the Objective 0/ Imposing Criminal Sanctions in Section lO(b) Actions under the 1934 Securi
ties Exchange Act?, 8 J. CORP. L. 527, 529 & n.22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Criminal
Sanctions in 10(b) Actions] (examines the possible criminal penalties involved in Rule lOb-5
violations); Comment, A Role/or the lOb-5 Private Action, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 460 (1981)
(focuses on the necessary role of Rule lOb-5 private actions in securities fraud litigation).
19. See supra note 3.
20. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 937.
21. Id.
22. Id. The purchase price of each unit of the limited partnership was $77,500. The
literature provided to the plaintiffs included an October 1977 private placement memoran
dum and a financial analysis sheet dated October 19, 1977. The literature stated that the
Greenspoint Project was to be a 308-unit complex in Harris County Texas, just outside the
Houston City limits. Id.
23. [d. Specifically, the memorandum stated:
[I]nvestment in the Units is suitable only for persons of adequate financial means
who have no need for liquidity with respect to their investment. Only persons
whose income is subject to high rates of income taxation will derive the full eco
nomic benefit of the intended tax benefits of this offering.
Id.
24. Id. at 938.
25. Id. From the sale, each plaintiff received $30,000 per unit, $47,500 short of their
investment. Id.
26. See supra note 3.
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plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew or should have known, and
failed to disclose, that the city of Houston was planning to annex the
land on which the Greenspoint Project was to be built,28 As a result,
costs should have been expected to rise substantially.29
The defendants answered, claiming affirmatively that each plain
tiff had realized tax benefits in excess of his loss on the investment. 3o
In August 1983, the plaintiffs made a motion pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c), 12(f) and/or 56 to strike these affirmative
defenses. 3 I At the close of oral argument, the district court judge
granted the 12(f) motion.32 The defendants then sought an interlocu
27. See supra note 3.
28. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 937.
29. Id. Costs could be expected to rise due to (1) the imposition of water, sewer, and
building permits, certificates of occupancy, taxes; (2) additional construction requirements
such as water and sewer lines; (3) additional roofing, plumbing and electrical work neces
sary to comply with Houston's building code; and (4) a delay in completion that might
jeopardize the project's financing. Id. at 937-38.
30. Id. at 938. The defendants reached this conclusion based on the assumption that
each plaintiff was taxed at a marginal rate of at least 50 per cent, an assumption the plain
tiffs did not challenge. Id.
31. Rule 12(c) states:
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for a judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made per
tinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Rule 12(f) states:
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon
the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous matter.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). Rule 56 states in pertinent part:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hear
ing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forth
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
32. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 938. Rule 12(f) is the "primary procedure for objecting to
an insufficient defense." 5 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE
DURE § 1380 (1969). Its most important application is when the parties' primary disagree
ment is about the legal implications of a defense, not controverted facts. Id. at § 1381.
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tory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b),33 which was
granted.34
B.

The District Court's Opinion

In granting the plaintiffs' Rule 12(f) motion, the district court
stated that although "tax considerations come into this case in deter
mining whether there was in fact a fraud committed,"35 it would
make "no sense to say that any loss to the defrauded investor and
hence, any gain or recovery which he is entitled to should be reduced
by the tax benefits that he realized."36
Judge Broderick, the district court judge, reasoned that the tax
benefits would have been realized regardless of whether there was a
fraud. 37 The investors could have invested in a different enterprise,
realized similar tax benefits, and not have suffered due to the alleged
Greenspoint fraud. 38 Realizing that the issue of tax benefit reduction
was of critical importance to the case, Judge Broderick certified the
issue as appropriate for review. 39
C.

The Second Circuit's Opinion

In the appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs were joined by
the SEC and the Department of Justice Tax Division which both filed
amicus curiae briefs. The arguments of each party will be considered
individually.
- -- - - - - - 
1.

The Plaintiffs

The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that reduc
tion of the award by the amount of tax benefits received would make
33. The section reads:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeala
ble under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control
ling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order. . . .
28 U.S.c. § 1292(b) (1982).
34. Sa/cer, 744 F.2d at 938. Since the issue of reduction of the recovery by tax bene
fits was critical, and the plaintiffs indicated they would drop the suit if they received an
adverse ruling, the court granted the defendants' motion. Id. at 938-39.
35. Id. at 938.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See supra note 33.
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"the government the banker for fraudulent tax shelter activity."40 In
Burgess v. Premier Corp.,41 the Ninth Circuit ruled that tax benefits in
tax shelter fraud litigation should be ignored. The Burgess court rea
soned that the promoters of the fraudulent investment, not the taxpay
ers, should bear the burden of the losses. 42 According to Burgess, any
double benefit to the plaintiff would be avoided by application of the
tax benefit rule. 43
Judge Mansfield, the court of appeals judge, distinguished Bur
gess by reasoning that in Salcer the government had already received
its end of the bargain. The residential development which the tax in
centives were designed to encourage had occurred. 44 He stated further
that the court was bound by section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act,45 which limits a plaintiirs recovery to "actual damages,"46 and
therefore was compelled to consider the tax benefits the plaintiffs had
bargained for and received. 47
2.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

Joined by the plaintiffs, the SEC in its amicus brief argued that
the tax benefits should not be considered because they fall within the
collateral source rule. 48 The collateral source rule prohibits considera
tion of benefits received from third parties as a result of separate trans
actions. 49 Under Rule lOb-5, however, courts have ruled that benefits
resulting directly from the transaction under scrutiny must be consid
40. Id. at 941, (quoting Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (1984)).
41. 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 838.
43. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 98-111 for an explanation of the tax benefit
rule.

44. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941.
45. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. . . .
48 Stat. 903 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78bb(a) (1982)); see 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1624-32 (1961).
46. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
47. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941.
48. Id.
49. Generally, the rule states that "[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the
injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (2) (1979). The comments provide that the collateral source
rule normally applies to insurance policies, employment benefits, gratuities, and social leg
islation benefits. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A comment (c)(I)-(4) (1979).
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ered. 50 With this standard in mind, the court held that the tax benefits
were too closely related to the transaction which led to the loss to be
excluded by the collateral source rule. 51 The court, concerned that the
plaintiffs might receive an undeserved windfall, 52 rejected the argu
ment for application of the collateral source rule, finding the tax bene
fits an inextricable part of the real estate tax shelter investment. 53
The SEC argued further that the plaintiffs' recovery should not be
reduced by tax benefits, because such benefits are the equivalent of pre
judgment interest.54 The purpose of pre-judgment interest is to com
pensate a party for the loss of the use of his money.55 Any recovery,
the SEC argued, would merely be compensation for any gain the plain
tiffs could have accrued with their investment had they gone else
where. The court quickly disposed of this argument on two grounds:
(1) the tax benefits would be an unreasonably large amount of pre
judgment interest,56 and (2) treatment of tax benefits as pre-jUdgment
interest was unnecessary. 57

3.

The Tax Division

The Department of Justice Tax Division argued that tax benefits
should not be considered because the tax benefits in any case may be
illusory.58 The division relied on Burgess v. Premier Corp.,59 and
Western Federal Corp. v. Davis,60 which held that because amended
returns may have to be filed under the tax benefit rule, any economic
50. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule JOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1159
(1977); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dividends);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 44 (10th Cir. 1971) (dividends or profits), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1071 (1971)
51. Saicer, 744 F.2d at 941-42.
52. Id. at 942. Specifically, the court stated:
Assuming proof that the $77,500 investment per unit was induced by fraud, not
only would they [the plaintiffs] retain the $97,866 already received per unit
($30,000 upon liquidation plus $67,866 tax savings) but they would gain another
$47,500 (i.e., the difference between the $77,500 paid per unit and the $30,000 per
unit received upon liquidation) for a total of $145,366. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1160; see also Cant V. A. G. Becker & Co., 384 F. Supp.
814,815 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (pre-judgment interest is awarded if plaintiff is denied the use of
his money).
56. Saicer, 744 F.2d at 942. In the court's view, the use of the plaintift's $77,500
investment for two years was clearly not worth the $63,866 of tax benefits the plaintiffs
claimed as pre-judgment interest. Id.
57. Id.
58. /d.
59. 727 F.2d 826.
60. 553 F. Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982).
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benefit due to tax deductions is illusory.61 Judge Mansfield, writing
for the Second Circuit, stated that the chance or possibility of a chal
lenge and subsequent inclusion does not justify the proposition that
those tax benefits should be ignored. 62 Since the IRS has had ample
time to act and has not done so, the court will act as though no chal
lenge is anticipated.63
Finally, the Tax Division argued that the tax benefit rule should
prevent the court from considering the tax consequences. 64 The tax
benefit rule requires a taxpayer who takes a deduction and later ob
tains a recovery to include the amount of that recovery in ordinary
income. 65 Under this theory, the government argued that rescission
ary damages recovered would amount to a recovery of the purchase
price, putting the plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had
they never owned the limited partnership interest. Such a recovery,
inconsistent with their claimed deductions, would force them to claim
the recovery as ordinary income. 66 Actual rescission, if it had been
possible in this case, would have forced the Greenspoint general part
ners (the defendants) to repurchase the limited partners' (plaintiffs)
shares in the project.
The court responded to this argument by noting that actual re
scission was impossible in this case, because the project had already
been sold. 67 Where actual rescission is unavailable, rescissionary dam
ages may be awarded. 68 The court concluded that under a rescission
ary damage theory, the tax benefit rule has no application. 69
4.

The Court's Conclusion

Although the issue was raised in the context of a motion to strike,
which theoretically would not force the court to reach a particular
61. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838; Western Federal, 553 F. Supp. at 820.
62. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 942. In order to justify such a treatment, the plaintiffs would
have to show evidence that the deductions were improperly taken. Id.
63. Id. at 942-43.
64. Id. at 943.
65. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
66. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. This is similar to what happened in Burgess, where the
tax shelter involved the purchase and sale of cattle. In Burgess, the remedy of actual rescis
sion was still available, however, because the fraudulent party could still be forced to repur
chase the livestock. Burgess, 727 F.2d 826.
67. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943.
68. See generally Jacobs, supra note 50, at 1118. Traditionally, rescissionary dam
ages have been awarded in the corporate securities area where a shareholder has been de
frauded. Because the defrauded investor's shares could not be replaced, he would be given
the value of those shares. This damage recovery is termed rescissionary damages.
69. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943.
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decision, Judge Mansfield made it clear that any damage award the
plaintiffs would recover must be reduced by any tax benefits received.
The result of this holding was to force the plaintiffs to drop their
action.70

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Actual Damages
It is essential to begin a consideration of this case with an under
standing of what damages are recoverable for fraud under the Securi
ties Exchange Act. In a Rule lOb-5 case, the primary place to tum for
guidance in determining damages is section 28(a) of the 1934 Act,71
The language of section 28(a) limits recovery to actual damages.72 At
the time the Securities Exchange Act was enacted, "actual damages"
had an accepted meaning. 73 In Birdsall v. Coolidge, the Supreme
Court stated, "Compensatory damages and actual damages mean the
same thing; that is, that the damages shall be the result of the injury
alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely
commensurate with the injury suffered . . . ."74 In Osofsky v. ZipJ,75
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the purpose of sec
tion 28(a) is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as
a result of wrongs committed in violation of the 1934 ACt."76 The
court's function, then, is to model a remedy best suited to fit the
harm. 77 This measure may include "out-of-pocket loss, the benefit-of
the-bargain or some other appropriate standard. "78

B.

The Benefit-of-the-Bargain Measure
Although the benefit-of-the-bargain79 measure has been awarded

70. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 45.
73. Gamatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977).
74. 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876).
75. 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 111.
77. Id.
78. Id. at Ill. In addition, although § 28(a) clearly does not authorize an award of
punitive damages, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968), courts have held
that punitive damage awards under state law may be awarded on a pendent state claim,
even when suit is brought under § 28(a). Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir.
1974); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972).
79. The benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages permits the plaintiff to recover
the difference between the value of the securities and the value that was represented by the
defendant. Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 381 (1974); accord Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1108-09 ("the
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under section 28(a),80 it would be an inappropriate measure in this
case. The benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages permits the
plaintiff to recover the difference between the value of the securities
and the value that was represented by the defendant. An award of
benefit-of-the-bargain damages is only appropriate when such damages
can be proved with reasonable certainty.81 There is no reasonable ba
sis to judge what amount could have been earned on the Greenspoint
Project had the investors not been defrauded. Any estimate would be
too speculative and cause the court to reject the benefit-of-the-bargain
measure.82
C.

The Out-ol-Pocket Measure

The out-of-pocket measure of damages is preferable for the situa
tion in Salcer. This is the traditional measure of damages in Rule lOb
S cases. 83 Under this method, the plaintiff should recover the differ
ence between the value of what he received in the transaction and the
security's purchase price. 84 Therefore, the plaintiffs should be entitled
to an amount equal to their original investment, less the amount they
received on the forced sale. 85
Once a court determines that some recovery is warranted, the
next problem is how the plaintiffs should recoup their investment. It
would be naive to suggest that the tax consequences should not play
some part in this decision. As the court stated in Bridgen v. Scott, 86
plaintiff's damages equal the difference between the value as represented by the defendant
and the fair value").
80. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970) (in certain cases involv
ing fraud and mergers "[w]here the defect in the proxy solicitation relates to the specific
terms of the merger, the district court might appropriately order an accounting to ensure
that the shareholders receive the value that was represented as coming to them"); Osojsky,
645 F.2d at 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (stockholders who were fraudulently induced to vote for
merger may recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages).
81. Osojsky, 645 F.2d at 114; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2)
(1977).
82. See Osojsky, 645 F.2d at 114. Dobbs has proferred another reason to reject this
measure of damages. Rule lOb-5 securities fraud cases are likely to involve a substantial
number of potential claimants. If each receives what he or she was promised, the value of
the stock in the hands of other innocent parties may be seriously impaired. D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 615 (1973). In this case, however, we are dealing
with a limited number of holders, so this problem is not present.
83. See. e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Sarlie v.
E. L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(a) (1977).
85. Plaintiffs' original investment was $77,500; they received $30,000 at the forced
sale. Therefore, if we disregard the tax benefits received, the plaintiffs should recover
$47,500.
86. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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asking the jury to consider a tax shelter case without permitting them
to consider the tax consequences would be "requiring the jury and the
Court to live in an artificial 'never-never land.' "87
The Salcer and Austin courts accounted for the tax consequences
by reducing any recovery by the amount of tax benefits received. 88 To
decide whether this is an expedient result, it should be considered in
light of the three parties involved. First, the plaintiffs are compen
sated to the extent of their out-of-pocket loss. This seems just. Sec
ond, the defendants may incur no loss as a result of their fraudulent
actions, a result that does not deter the defendants or others from
committing similar acts.89 Third, the government is left to bear a por
tion of the cost of the defendants' fraud through tax benefits to the
plaintiffs.
Although there is merit to the court's argument that the govern
ment has already received the benefit it bargained for,90 it is still inex
pedient for the government to act as "the banker for fraudulent tax
shelter activity."91 The defendants are not paying the damages; the
government is paying. One purpose of the securities acts is certainly
prevention and deterrence, especially if the wrongdoer was conscious
of his actions. 92 At least one jurisdiction has ruled that deterrence is
the primary motive behind the securities acts.93 That purpose is not
being furthered by allowing government tax benefits to replace defend
ant liability. Considering the three parties involved, the Salcer result
is inexpedient because it leaves the government to bear the cost of the
defendant's fraudulent activity.
87. Id. at 1061.
88. Austin, 675 F.2d 168; Salcer, 744 F.2d 935.
89. A central purpose behind Rule 10b-5 and the securities acts is the protection of
investors through full disclosure. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Unless
the fraudulent defendants are punished, others are not deterred from similar deceptive
practices. To achieve this end, any fraud provisions of the securities acts are construed
broadly. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 795 (6th Cir. 1967). "Of course,
it is well recognized that the securities and exchange legislation has broad remedial pur
poses for protection of the investing public and should be liberally construed." Id.
90. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941.
91. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838.
92. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933).
93. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. SUpp. 544, 567 (E.D.N.Y
1971); Note, Ancillary Reliefin SEC Injunction Suits/or Violation ofRule JOb-5, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 656, 663-65 (1966). In some cases criminal penalties may be imposed. Under
section 32(a) of the 1934 Act "any person who willfully violates any provision of the chap
ter" may be subject to criminal penalties. 48 Stat. 904 (1934)(codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982». The purpose behind section 32(a) is to punish the individual and
deter others from committing similar acts. Criminal Sanctions ill Section JO(b) Actions,
supra note 18, at 540.
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Since the Salcer court's measure of damages is not the most expe
dient one, a more appropriate alternative should be sought. The alter
native chosen by the district court in Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture 94
was to allow recovery without regard to the plaintiff's tax benefits.95
The district court stated that such a result is equitable because under
the tax benefit rule any recovery will be included in the plaintiff's in
come. As previously stated, the tax benefit rule requires a taxpayer
who takes a deduction and later obtains a recovery to include the
amount of that recovery in ordinary income for the year of recovery to
the extent of the deductions taken. 96 The court in Freschi went on to
note that were the tax benefit rule to be ignored, "the losers would be
the government and plaintiffs, and the only winner would be
defendants."97
D.

The Tax Benefit Rule

The court in Salcer maintained that the tax benefit rule would not
apply to the facts of this case. The court stated that because rescissio
nary damages are not the "same as rescission"98 and are not "inconsis
tent with the plaintiff's prior tax position,"99 an award of such
damages would not result in application of the tax benefit rule. Under
the tax benefit rule, only recoveries fundamentally inconsistent with
earlier deductions must be included as income in the current year. 100
A thorough examination will show the court applied the rule
incorrectly.
Application of the tax benefit rule is essential in this case; without
it a recovery by the plaintiffs would not be taxed. To determine
whether a court award of damages is to be taxed as income, it is criti
cal to look at the nature of the action settled.101 It has long been set
tled that if the basis of the recovery is an injury to capital, then the
recovery is not taxed as income.102 If, however, the recovery is for loss
94. 588 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
95. Id. at 1260.
96. Although the tax benefit rule was created in the courts, it has been given the
approval of Congress through the enactment of I.R.C. § 111 which limits the rule's applica
tion. 1.R.c. § 111 (1982).
97. Freschi, 588 F. Supp. at 1260.
98. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943.
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
101. Carter's Estate v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 910 (1962).
.
102. Durkee V. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1947).
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of profits, \03 or punitive damages,I04 then the recovery is taxable. The
burden of proving that the settlement represents a recovery of capital
rather than ordinary income rests with the taxpayer. \Os Because plain
tiffs' claim for damages in Salcer is for recovery of their original capi
tal investment, any monies received from damage award would not
be treated as income, and therefore would not be taxed.
Since the recovery would not be taxed as income, the recovery
will only be taxed if the tax benefit rule is applied. In Hillsboro Na
tional Bank v. Commissioner, \06 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
basic purpose of the tax benefit rule is to achieve rough transactional
parity in tax . . . and to protect the Government and the taxpayer
from the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of as
sumptions that an event in a subsequent year proves to be errone
OUS."I07 Although not all recoveries will justify application of the tax
benefit rule, \08 the recovery of a loss is the prototypical event that in
vokes the rule. \09 In Hillsboro, the Supreme Court stated that if a later
event is "fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the
deduction was initially based,"lIO then the income from that transac
tion will be included as income in the current taxable year. 11 1

a

103. Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210, 211 (7th Cir. 1962). If the
injury is for loss of profits, the claim also determines the nature of the income realized.
Sanders v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629, 635 (10th Cir. 1955).
104. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (money received as
exemplary damages or the punitive two-thirds portion of an antitrust treble damage recov
ery must be reported as income).
105. Morse v. United States, 371 F.2d 474, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (court found gain
realized from the sale of a partnership interest was a gain from the sale of a capital asset,
rather than ordinary income).
106. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
107. Id. at 383; see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
265, 270 (1978).
108. As the Supreme Court stated:
Not every unforeseen event will require the taxpayer to report income in the
amount of his earlier deduction. On the contrary, the tax benefit rule will 'cancel
out' an earlier deduction only when a careful examination shows that the later
event is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was
initially based.
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383.
109. See Bittker and Kanner, supra note 107 at 273.
110. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383.
Ill. Id. at 389. In his dissent, ~ustice Stevens criticized the Hillsboro majority for
causing uncertainty in result and enlarging the tax gatherer's discretion to reexamine past
transactions. Id. at 416.
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Rescissionary Damages 112

The question now becomes whether a recovery of rescissionary
damages is inconsistent with the deductions taken by the plaintiffs. If
such a recovery is inconsistent, then it would have to be included as
income in the year recovered. As the Court of Appeals points out, if
this were a case of actual rescission, the tax benefit rule would
apply. 113
Rescission revokes the bargain between the parties and attempts
to return them to their prior position. 114 Rescissionary damages are
awarded when actual rescission is no longer possible. liS Since the
Greenspoint Project had already been sold, the option of rescission
was foreclosed, and a rescissionary theory had to be employed. Gen
erally, rescissionary damages equal the fair value paid, measured at the
time of purchase, less the fair value paid at the time of sale. 116 Rescis
sionary damages seek the same end as rescission, to place the plaintiffs
in the position they would have been in had they never entered the
bargain. In fact, courts use identical language in defining the two the
ories of damages. Both seek to return the injured parties to the "status
quo ante."117
To state that an award of rescission is fundamentally inconsistent
with the plaintiffs' deductions, and an award of rescissionary damages
is not, is to elevate form over substance. Both yield the same result,
for the same reasons, but utilize somewhat different means. It is a
fundamental concept of taxation that substance should not be exalted
over form. liS Application of the Code should never tum on "attenu
112. This note consistently uses the term rescissionary damages. However, courts
and commentators referring to this theory have used several terms: rescissionary. rescissory;
and rescissional; Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943 rescissionary; Austin, 768 F.2d at 957 rescissory;
Jacobs, supra note 50 at 1114 rescissional.
113. The rule could apply to Burgess, 727 F.2d 826, where actual rescission oc
curred. The court in Salcer is correct in pointing out that the court in Burgess incorrectly
applied the rule. The plaintiffs in Burgess would not be required to amend their previous
returns but would be required to include any recovery as income in the current year.
Courts that have considered the issue of rescission and the tax benefit rule have not
reached consistent results; see Note, Tax Consequences ofRescission: The Interplay Between
Private and Public Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 562,575 & n.55 (1975).
114. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
ll5. Id. at 742 & n.18.
ll6. See Jacobs, supra note 50 at Ill8-19.
ll7. Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361; Myzel, 386 F.2d at 742.
ll8. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572-73 (1978); Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470
(1935). In a myriad of factual situations, the courts, while applying the Code, have looked
beyond the form of the transaction involved, and evaluated the substance to discern the
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ated subtleties." 119
Rescissionary damages attempt to return injured plaintiffs to the
status quo ante. Any deductions taken by the plaintiffs must be consid
ered fundamentally inconsistent with a recovery that places the plain
tiff in a position equivalent to what they would have been in had the
transaction never occurred. Interest deductions taken for loans con
sidered to have never occurred,120 or depreciation deductions for
projects considered to have never existed,121 must present a fundamen
economic reality of the transaction. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 260, 291 (1946)
(court determined no real partnership existed between husband and wife, and income was
properly attributable solely to husband); O'Hare v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.
1981) (court held taxpayer was a guarantor in substance, not a joint venturer, and therefore
held fees were ordinary income rather than capital gain); Republic Petroleum Corp. v.
United States, 613 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1980) (taxpayer attempted to cloak assumption
of a mortgage into a promissory note, the court looked to the substance of the transaction,
and held taxpayer's intention could not have been anything other than to assume the mort
gage); United States v. Kennedy Construction Co. of NSB Inc., 572 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir.
1978) (contractor made advances to subcontractor for the specific purpose of paying wages
to specific employees, court held substance of the transaction was a direct payment by
contractor to subcontractor's employees, and thus contractor was liable for taxes which
should have been withheld); Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974)
(court held description of transaction as "part sale and part gift" or "net gift" had no effect
on the substance of the transaction); Stahl v. United States, 441 F.2d 999, 1001 (D.e. Cir.
1970) (court determined loan of securities to a securities firm was in substance a bailment,
and did not create a debtor-creditor relationship); Comtel Corp. v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d
791, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (court held substance of transaction was a loan with security
rather than a purchase and resale of stock, and hence taxpayer was forced to recognize
ordinary income); Palmer v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 974,975 (1st Cir. 1965) (taxpayers
transferred real property to a corporation wholly owned by them, and carried out a previ
ously arranged sales contract, court held the sale was actually made by the taxpayers);
Foxman v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 466, 469 (3d Cir. 1965) (court determined that transac
tion between two partners to buyout third partner was in substance a purchase and sale for
tax purposes rather than a liquidation of the retiring partner's interest); Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1963) (court found substance of a partnership
agreement was for employment services, and fees constituted payment for services and not
a distributive share of partnership income); Garcia v. Commissioner, 80 T.e. 491, 495
(1983) (court held interim steps taken by the taxpayer did not preclude transaction from
qualifying as an exchange of like kind property, when in substance the same result was
intended and achieved); Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, 582 (1979) (taxpayer's
characterization of payments as management fees was disallowed, because in substance
payments were commissions); Johnson Investment & Rental Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.e.
895,903 (1978) (taxpayer claimed payments were rent, court held substance of transaction
indicated payments were actually mineral royalties); Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc. v.
Commisssioner, 65 T.C. 640, 657 (1975) (court held cost ofleasehold improvements had to
be amortized over useful life of improvements rather than lease period, because it was ap
parent the length of lease term was indefinite).
119. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
120. Generally, an interest deduction is allowed for "all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982).
121. Reasonable depreciation deductions are permitted as an "allowance for exhaus
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tal inconsistency. The tax benefit rule would require any rescissionary
damage recovery by the plaintiffs to be included in income. In
Freschi,122 the district court stated that were this application of the tax
benefit rule to be ignored, "the losers would be the government and
the plaintiffs, and the only winner would be the defendants."123 If a
party is to benefit, "[i]t is more apppropriate to give the defrauded
party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them."124
Reduction of damages by the tax benefits received also has the
result of discouraging defrauded investors from suing. The Supreme
Court has stated that the securities acts were designed to encourage
private actions. 125 Furthermore, where federally secured rights are vi
olated, courts are given wide latitude to "provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."126 Given this
discretion, it would be improvident to rely on the subtle distinction
between rescission and rescissionary damages. In light of these con
siderations, the more expedient rule would be to exclude evidence of
tax benefits with the understanding that application of the tax benefit
rule will result in the inclusion of the recovery in the plaintiff's income.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Salcer, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Rule
lOb-5 damage award must be reduced by any tax benefits received by
the plaintiff. 127 Although this rule is a reasonable one, it is not the
most expedient. If we consider the interests of the plaintiffs, the de
fendants, and the government, it is more appropriate to place the bur
tion, wear and tear" on property "used in the trade or business," or "property held for the
production of income." I.R.C. §§ 167(a)(I) & (2) (1982).
122. 588 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)
(quoted in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968».
125. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Private actions provide "a
necessary supplement" to actions by the government. "[T]he possibility of civil damages
serves as a most effective weapon in enforcement. . . ." Id.
126. Id. at 433; the Supreme Court explained this principle:
Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). (citations omitted)
127. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984).
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den on the fraudulent parties, the defendants. Such a decision would
prevent the court from reducing a damage award by the amount of tax
benefits received.
Mark W. Zeno

